THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE BILL & THE TURKISH
REACTION IN IRAQ
By Anthony H. Cordesman,
Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy
WASHINGTON,— Tragic as the fate of the
Armenians may have been in the aftermath of World War I, the
fact remains that the issue is more than half a century old.
Turkish-Armenian conciliation might serve an important
purpose, as might any effort to reconcile Armenians, Turks,
and Azerbaijanis. The dead, however, are not grateful, and
stirring up new sources of ethnic and sectarian tension are
the last thing the region needs.
This is particularly true when the end
result is to create problems for the living. Pushing Turkey
to be more hostile to Armenia is scarcely a useful goal, but
Iraq and the Kurds are affected as well – along with vital
US interests. As a result, the net impact of the Armenian
genocide bill may well be to create yet another pointless
regional source of anger against the US – this time coming
from the Congress instead of the Administration.
Turkish Government and Military Support
of the US Presence in Iraq
Americans need to understand that the
Turkish government and Turkish military have provided
substantial support to the US in Iraq since the fall of
Saddam Hussein. The US efforts to push Turkey into allowing
US troops to invade Iraq from Turkish soil made have failed
in the run up to the invasion, but Turkey has since become a
key element in the conduct of US operations in Iraq.
Reporting by ABC News describes this
support and the importance of the cost savings of flying
cargo planes to Turkey instead of Germany -- which would
become the alternate hub into Iraq if turkey closed its
facilities.
One key area of support is the movement
of fuel goes through Habur Gate that is the main entryway
into Iraq from Turkey. The cargo hub at Incirlik Air Base
serves both Iraq and Afghanistan. 74% of air cargo into Iraq
transits Incirlik. Six US military C-17 aircraft based at
Incirlik move the amount of cargo it took 9-10 military
aircraft to move from Germany, saving $160 million per year.
KC-135 tankers operating out of Incirlik
have flown 3,400 sorties and delivered 35 million gallons of
fuel to U.S. fighter and transport aircraft on missions in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
Approximately 25% of the fuel used by
Coalition forces enters Iraq from Turkey via the Habur Gate
crossing, which is the main entryway into Iraq from Turkey.
In addition, 29% of the fuel used by
Iraqi consumers -- 250,000 tankers and 1.6 billion gallons
of fuel - enters through Habur Gate, despite Iraqi arrears
that have approached $1 billion.
Turkey provides 19% of the food and water
that Iraqis consume through Habur Gate.
Turkey continues to provide blanket
clearance for military over flights supporting Operation
Iraqi Freedom (Off) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in
Afghanistan.
Turkey exports 270 MW of electricity to
northern Iraq and has plans to increase that total to 1000
MW, or 25% of Iraq’s current peak capacity.
Over 20,000 Turks have worked in Iraq
since 2004, and approximately 150 (mostly truck drivers)
have lost their lives in insurgent attacks. About 1,000
Turkish companies are active in Iraq.
Turkey has authorized the temporary
deployment of 32 USAF F- 16’s to Incirlik Air Base during
January-February 2007, providing vital training and
experience to the U.S. crews. A second rotational deployment
is scheduled for May 2007.
Turkey welcomed 16 US Navy ships to
Turkish ports in 2006, including 9 port calls for US crewmen
and 7 fuel deliveries for Coalition forces in Iraq. Six US
Navy ships also made passages through the Turkish Straits on
their way to/from the Black Sea. Eight to ten port calls are
expected in 2007.
The Turkish Backlash Against the US
As for Turkish attitudes towards the US,
before the Armenian genocide bill and now – it is important
that Americans understand just how concerned Turkey are with
the PKK issue, and how truly hostile Turkish public opinion
has become to the US since 2001 because of the perception
the US is hostile to Muslims and its actions in Iraq have
threatened Turkish security. The Turkish people do not
support the aid the Turkish government and military have
quietly given to the US.
Public opinion polls make it all too
clear that Turks see the PKK issue in terms of what they
estimate are nearly 30,000 casualties to PKK attacks over
the years. They see the US invasion of Iraq as having
created a Kurdish zone that is hostile to Turkey, the US as
having blocked Turkish counterterrorism operations inside
the Iraqi Kurdish zone, and the US as having increased the
threat to Turkey.
A Pew survey of Global attitudes issued
in July found that Turks saw terrorism as a major issue, and
that the number of Turks who saw terrorism as a "very big
issue" had risen from 57% in 2002 to 72% in 2007.[i][i] The
survey does not separate Al Qa’ida type terrorism from the
PKK, but it is clear from internal Turkish surveys that non
Kurds ("white" and "black" Turks see the PKK as a major
threat and terrorist movement.
In the same survey, 64% of Turks polled
saw the US as the biggest global threat to Turkey --
followed by Iraq as the biggest threat (13%) and Russia (9%)
while only 6% of Turks saw Iran as a major threat. The poll
found that 77% Turks were very worried/somewhat worried
about the US becoming a military threat to Turkey, while
only 15% were "not too/not all worried." The Pew trust found
that when Turks were asked to cite their closet allies, they
listed Germany (13%), Pakistan (11%) and Saudi Arabia (9%).
This does not mean Turks are supporting
Islamist extremism, although the level of rejection of
Palestinian style suicide attacks is different. Turks feel
into the mean in the Muslim would in terms of opposition to
suicide bombing (56% against versus 16% some form of
approval). The number showing confidence in Bin Laden
dropped, however, from 15% in 2002 to only 5% in 2007. Some
42% of Turkey also saw the rise of Sunni and Shi'ite
tensions as a growing problem in the world, and another 23%
saw it as a growing problem limited to Iraq.
The Kurdish Issue
It is far from clear what Turkey will or
will not do in Iraq, and whether the US debate over the
Armenian genocide bill will help reduce Turkish restraint in
going into the Kurdish zone in Iraq. The US should, however,
be careful not to overreact if Turkey does send forces in to
the Kurdish area. Any analysis of events must focus
carefully on the seriousness of what Turkish forces actually
do, and be careful to put the Turkish backlash from the
Armenian genocide bill in the context of the overall growth
of Turkish hostility towards the US.
It is far from clear how serious yet
another Turkish incursion into Iraq would actually be. Some
Turkish officers -- mostly retired – have talked recklessly
about going deep into Iraq territory, and a few have talked
about going to Mosul and the Kirkuk oil fields. None of this
talk has previously led to any such action on Turkey’s part
in the past. The fact is that the Turks have repeatedly sent
significant forces into the Kurdish area after the PKK
during the last two decades without any objective other that
weakening or destroying the PKK.
Turkey sent forces equivalent to a small
corps or several divisions into Iraq repeatedly during the
Iran-Iraq War and Saddam turned a blind eye. Smaller Turkish
elements -- often several battalion equivalents --
repeatedly went into the Kurdish areas from 1992-2002. There
has often been a covert Turkish Special Forces elements
present in the Barzani dominated area and operating against
PKK forces during the periods when Turkey was not officially
operating in the area.
This obviously is not a desirable
solution to the problem. Iraqi sovereignty and the security
of the Kurdish zone in Iraq ultimately require an Iraqi
solution to the PKK problem. This explains why the US made
real efforts to stop Turkish penetration after 2003,
creating a firestorm in Turkey when Turkish covert units and
special forces were detained or made to leave.
At the same time, the PKK presence in
Iraq has steadily expanded and been a base for recent PKK
attacks on Turkey. The Turks have also attempted to work
with the Kurdish government in Iraq, and do have covert
liaison units. At one point, the Barzani elements of the
Pesh Merga did try to operate against PKK forces. They
failed and took some losses. Since that time, the Iraqi
Kurds have tended to leave the PKK alone. There also seems
to be growing some collusion between Kurdish elements in the
ISF and border forces and the PKK.
In short, much depends on how deep the
Turks go, the numbers they invade with, what they do, and
how long they stay. The US, Iraqi Kurds, and Iraqi
government has every reason to protest, but selective anti-PKK
operations have a quarter of a century of precedents; the
Iraqi Kurds are partially to blame; and it is far from clear
just how destabilizing such Turkish action will be. It might
even be positive -- forcing Iraq's Kurds to realize they are
far better off as Iraqis than in seeking independence or
extreme versions of autonomy.
The Kurdish Zone in Iraq
Americans also need to be more careful
about talking about partition, federalism that will be seen
in Turkey as the near equivalent of Iraqi Kurdish
independence, and the "success" of the Kurdish zone in Iraq
as if Iraq’s Kurds could continue to operate without being
part of Iraq as a nation.
The Kurds have made very real advances
since the creation of a Kurdish security zone after the end
of the Gulf War, but much of their present success is not
sustainable. Moreover, Barzani vs. Talibani tensions have
threatened such success on several occasions. They continue,
and the Pesh Merga and Kurdish elements of the ISF are
anything but united.
The Kurds had 11 years of US protection
from 1992-2003 that other Iraqis lacked. During that time,
they got US aid, made money off of smuggling between Iraq
and other countries, and benefited from a large share of the
UN oil for food money.
Since 2003, they have benefited from a
large share of the US aid pie -- particularly because aid
money goes into secure areas and the areas with the best
lobbyists -- and from a major share of Iraq's national oil
export income where they have been able to spend on civil
projects far more securely than other parts of Iraq.
This kind of economic “success,” however,
will not be sustained when the present flood of aid and
wartime spending ends, and the present sharing of oil
revenues comes at a time that 80% of Iraq's oil exports come
from the fields in the South. Much of the current prosperity
of the Kurdish security would vanish without outside
subsidies. It will also take years before -- if ever -- the
oil fields actually in the current Kurdish zone could begin
to sustain the present Kurdish zone economy.
The US also has good reason to be careful
about any expansion of the Kurdish zone or form of
federalism that gives the Kurds control over the minorities
in the significant parts of Iraqi governorates where Kurds
would then dominate areas that are not Kurdish. The
attention given to sectarian cleansing sometimes leads
Americans to ignore Kurdish efforts to take control of Arab,
Turcoman, and other areas. This includes efforts to take
control over Kirkuk, and expand Kurdish control over the
broader ethnic fault line east of the Mosul area. Ethnic
cleansing along the Kurdish is not close to being as violent
as sectarian cleansing, but is scarcely “soft” or something
the US should support.
