STRATEGIC GAMES OF IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA IN IRAQ
Ehsan AHRARI
The chairman of “Alexandria Strategic
Paradigms”
Iran is
setting up a miniature Iran in southern Iraq, while
expanding its influence in the country. Saudi Arabia, on the
other hand, is left playing diplomatic catch-up in trying to
influence events. This underscores the power differential
between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran is a real power in Iraq.
Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, remains a “wanna-be-power”.
It also illustrates that Iran’s strategy in post-Saddam
Hussein Iraq was well crafted to take into account the
possibility of the US faltering there.
The
Iranians figured that the US Government contemplated on
toppling Saddam rather than setting up a stable order in
Iraq and that it lacked a cohesive post-conflict plan. Thus,
Iran has become convinced that the chaos would prevail. What
it could not have anticipated was the magnitude of that
chaos, a train of events set in motion by the US deciding to
abolish the Iraqi army and de-Ba’athify the country.
In the
broader context, Iran was driven by another objective:
ensuring that it would not become the next victim of
President George W. Bush’s doctrine of “regime change”. This,
more than anything else, would have driven Iran either to
exploit the Iraqi chaos to its advantage, or to make its own
contribution to worsen it. Either way, political and
religious realities were overwhelmingly in favor of Iran.
Sixty-five
percent of the Iraqi population is Shiite. Iran and Iraq
have had decades of close cooperation and extensive
exchanges on religious issues.. In the realm of politics, on
the other hand, Iran has played a constant role in
supporting and nurturing anti-Saddam forces so as to topple
the dictatorship. Consequently, no neighboring country of
Iraq knew the political dynamics of Iraq better than Iran.
In the
post-Saddam era, two Shiite clerics were destined to work
directly and indirectly to substantiate Iran’s political
objectives. Abdul Aziz al Hakim, the chairman of the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, is a pro-Iranian
cleric. His Badr Brigades was a nuisance to Saddam and has
emerged as one of the major military organizations in the
past three years. Furthermore, during the initial phases of
the post-Saddam era, Iran activated its Quds Forces. This
force rather concentrated on intelligence operations and
most important of all was kept away from unconventional
warfare. For political and religious reasons, Iran never
intended to leave Iraq alone. Even if the US managed to
stabilize Iraq, Iran would have opposed the US existence
there. The fact that the United States has faltered in Iraq
has made Iran’s task of enhancing its own influence
considerably easier.
From the
perspectives of gathering intelligence, there is little
doubt that the Revolutionary Guards have done well. What is
not clear is whether they played any role in enhancing the
capabilities of Sunni insurgents and the mujaheddin to take
on the Americans and the Iraqi security forces. If the
Revolutionary Guards did play a role in training Sunni
insurgents in asymmetric tactics, Iran has, indeed, taken a
major gamble, as in all likelihood the insurgents will turn
against Iran once the Americans are out of the country.
However, Iran might have calculated that ousting the US
forces is crucial enough to justify this risk. The overall
outcome of Iran’s complicated maneuvers in Iraq is that its
influence is definitely on the rise, and it will focus on
constantly bleeding US forces, thereby increasing the
prospects of withdrawal.
Saudi
Arabia does not fare very well in this power game. Even
though the Sunni Arab population of Iraq is about 25%, the
Saudi rulers have no way of knowing what percentage of that
population really supports Al Qaeda. All such forces are
acutely opposed to Saudi Arabia. It is possible that Saudi
Intelligence Service is cooperating with the remnants of
Saddam’s security forces in an attempt to sabotage Iran’s
strategic objectives. But this is a very tall order,
considering that Iranian intelligence forces have most
likely penetrated all regions of Iraq. Equally important,
they have been in Iraq for a long time and know the terrain
well. Besides, Saudi Arabia cannot afford to sabotage
Iranian objectives without finding out what the US is really
up to in Iraq, and all indications are that it will be
around for some time yet. Riyadh would thus conclude that,
instead of conducting a trench war with Iranian intelligence,
it would be preferable to rely on conventional diplomacy for
stabilizing Iraq – and that this would be better done
quietly behind closed doors.
Even as an
advantaged actor, Iran would very much prefer that. Iranian
leaders could not have been amused by King Abdullah of
Jordan’s public musings about a “Shiite crescent” a few
months ago. They are not interested in overplaying their
card by confronting Sunni states on that issue. They are
much too concerned about resolving their multi-dimensional
conflict with the Bush administration and minimizing the
chances of their regime being changed. Cooperation between
Iran and Saudi Arabia would serve these goals. For the US,
such cooperation, though it is not an optimal development,
may not be too harmful to its interests. As a long shot,
Iranian leaders may even decide to persuade the Saudis to
use their influence in Washington to persuade the Bush
administration to engage Iran in comprehensive dialogue.
There is little evidence at present that Riyadh has started
such a campaign, but it could happen in the coming weeks.
